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Abstract Modern neural networks are highly non-robust
against adversarial manipulation. A significant amount of
work has been invested in techniques to compute lower
bounds on robustness through formal guarantees and to build
provably robust models. However, it is still difficult to get
guarantees for larger networks or robustness against larger
perturbations. Thus attack strategies are needed to provide
tight upper bounds on the actual robustness. We significantly
improve the randomized gradient-free attack for ReLU net-
works [9], in particular by scaling it up to large networks. We
show that our attack achieves similar or significantly smaller
robust accuracy than state-of-the-art attacks like PGD or the
one of Carlini and Wagner, thus revealing an overestimation
of the robustness by these state-of-the-art methods. Our attack
is not based on a gradient descent scheme and in this sense
gradient-free, which makes it less sensitive to the choice of
hyperparameters as no careful selection of the stepsize is
required.
Keywords Adversarial attacks
1 Introduction
Recent work has shown that state-of-the-art neural networks
are non-robust [33,11], in the sense that a small adversarial
change of a (even with high confidence) correctly classi-
fied input leads to a wrong decision again potentially with
high confidence. While [33,11] have brought up this problem
in object recognition tasks, the problem itself has been dis-
cussed for some time in the area of email spam classification
[10,20]. However, since machine learning is nowadays used
as a component for automated decision making in safety crit-
ical systems e.g. autonomous driving or medical diagnosis
systems, fixing this problem should have high priority as
it potentially can lead to fatal failures beyond the eminent
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security issue [19].
While a lot of research has been done on attacks and
defenses [28,19,18,38] it has been shown that all existing
defense strategies can be broken again [5,2], with two ex-
ceptions. The first one are methods which provide provable
guarantees on the robustness of a network [16,34,13,29,36,
22,35,31,8] and which have proposed new ways of training
[36,22] or of regularizing neural networks [13,8] to make
them more robust. While this area has made huge progress it
is still difficult to provide such guarantees for medium-sized
networks [36,22]. Then the only way to evaluate robustness
for large networks is still to use successful attacks which thus
provide, for every clean input, an upper bound on the norm
of the minimal perturbation necessary to change the class. In
fact, this is an approach to the problem of estimating robust-
ness symmetric to formal certificates, which are lower bounds
on the actual robustness. The first attack scheme based on
L-BFGS has been proposed in [33], afterwards research has
produced a variety of adversarial attacks of growing effective-
ness [11,15,23]. However, it has been recognized that simple
attacks often fail when they face a defense created against
the specific attacks but which can be easily broken again us-
ing other more powerful techniques [5,2]. Apart from these
white-box attacks (model is known at attack time), also sev-
eral black-box attacks have been proposed [19,25,4].
The second exception is adversarial training with a relatively
powerful attack [21] based on projected gradient descent
(PGD). This defense technique could not be broken even
using the state-of-the-art attack of Carlini and Wagner [6,5,
2].
In this paper we extend the white-box attack scheme pro-
posed in [9], originally designed to attack fully-connected
neural networks using ReLU type activation function. It is
well known that these networks result in continuous piece-
wise affine functions [1], that is the domain is decomposed
into linear regions given as polytopes on which the classifier
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is affine. The principle of the attack of [9] is then to solve the
minimal adversarial perturbation problem on each linear re-
gion as it boils down to a convex optimization problem. In [9]
they report that the attack outperforms the DeepFool attack
[23] and the state-of-the-art Carlini-Wagner attack (CW) [6]
by up to 9% relative improvement in the norm of the smallest
perturbation δ needed to change the classifier decision. How-
ever, the attack has been limited to small fully-connected
neural networks with up to 10000 neurons. In this paper we
show that this attack can also be applied to convolutional,
residual and dense networks with piecewise affine activation
functions as well as max and average pooling layers and
scales to networks consisting of more than 2.5 million neu-
rons and achieving state-of-the-art performance.
The main contributions of this paper are 1) an upscaling of
the attack to large networks so that it can be applied to stan-
dard networks for CIFAR-10 and 2) supporting now the most
common types of layers, e.g. convolutional and residual ones.
The key for the upscaling is a very fast solver for the dual
of the quadratic program which has to be solved for finding
minimal l2 perturbations. The employed accelerated gradient
descent scheme achieves quickly medium accuracy, which is
enough for our purposes. Moreover, we use the fact that the
solver just needs matrix-vector products of the constraint ma-
trix and thus the explicit computation of the constraint matrix
is not needed. This leads to a small memory footprint so that
we can use this solver directly on the GPU. Finally, compared
to [9] we have designed a more efficient sampling scheme of
the next region to be checked. All these speed-ups together
allow us now to attack networks as long as they basically fit
into GPU memory. In this paper the largest network has over
2.8 million neurons, which is 280 times more than in [9]. We
show that in most of the cases our attack performs at least
as good as the best attack among PGD [21], DeepFool [23]
and CW [6]. In particular our algorithm works well across
architectures, datasets and training schemes, being always the
most successful or very close to the best of the competitors.
Notably, we show especially for models trained with adver-
sarial training [21] against the l∞-norm and provably robust
models [8,36] that the other attacks overestimate, partially
by large margin, the robustness wrt to the l2-norm.
We thus recommend our attack if a reliable estimation of
the real robustness of a network is needed, as our attack not
only performs well on average but does not, unlike the estab-
lished state-of-the-art attacks (PGD, DeepFool, CW), lead
to gross overestimation of the robustness of the network in
some cases.
2 Piecewise affine formulation of ReLU networks
It has been noted in [1,9] that ReLU networks, that is net-
works that use only the ReLU activation function, result in
continuous piecewise affine classifiers in the form f : Rd →
RK , where d is the input dimension and K the number of
classes. This implies that there exists a finite set of polytopes
Qr, with r = 1, . . . , R, such that on each polytope the clas-
sifier is an affine function, that is there exists W ∈ RK×d
and b ∈ RK such that f(x) = Wx + b holds for x ∈ Qr.
Note that, although we here focus on ReLU, the same prop-
erty hold for any piecewise affine activation function, like
Leaky ReLU. In the following we generalize the construction
from [9] done for fully-connected networks to the case of
other layer types, so that it extends to convolutional networks
(CNNs), ResNets [12] and DenseNets [14].
We can write ReLU networks with L hidden layers as the
composition of L+ 1 functions, each standing for one of the
layers (including the output layer), f (1), . . . , f (L+1). Note
that we consider the application of the activation function
as a stand-alone layer (called ReLU layer). Denoting with
nj , for j = 1, . . . , L+ 1, the number of units in layer j (in
particular nL+1 = K and we assume n0 = d), we can define,
for j = 1, . . . , L+ 1,
f (j) : Rn0 × Rn1 × . . .× Rnj−1 −→ Rnj (1)
and the output of the j-th layer is obtained as
x(j) = f (j)(x, x(1), . . . , x(j−1)), (2)
where x is the input of the network. Then, the final output of
the classifier f is given by
f(x) ≡ x(L+1) = f (L+1)(x, x(1), . . . , x(L)). (3)
If we make explicit the relation between each x(j) and the
input x we can recover the formulation of classifier f as a
function from Rd to RK . While this definition of a classifier
differs from the usual recursive formulation, it allows to
handle also connections between non-consecutive layers (as
it happens for residual networks [12]). Finally, the class c
which is assigned to x is given by
c = argmax
r=1,...,K
fr(x) = argmax
r=1,...,K
x(L+1)r .
Every layer has one of the following types: dense, convolu-
tional, skip connection, ReLU (or leaky ReLU), avg-pooling,
max-pooling, batch normalization. We now show how it is
possible to rewrite each of them, f (j), j = 1, . . . , L+ 1, as
an affine function
A(j) : Rn0 × Rn1 × . . .× Rnj−1 −→ Rnj ,
A(j)(t) = A(j)t+ a(j),
(4)
with A(j) ∈ Rnj×Nj , a(j) ∈ Rnj , Nj =
∑j−1
i=0 ni, in the
linear region Q(x) corresponding to the input x (see below
for the definition). For simplicity in the following we call
y = (x, x(1), . . . , x(j−1)) the fixed input of the layer f (j) we
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are considering (see Equation (2)).
First, let us notice that dense, convolutional, skip connection
and batch normalization (at inference time) layers are already
affine operations, which means A(j) ≡ f (j).
Second, ReLU layers apply the function σ(t) = max{0, t}
componentwise to the output of the previous layer. Thus,
they can be, noticing that y is defined so that the last nj com-
ponents correspond to x(j−1), replaced by linear functions
explicitly represented by the matrices Σ ∈ Rnj×Nj defined
as
Σ =

0 . . . 0 h(x
(j−1)
1 ) 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 0 h(x
(j−1)
2 ) . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . h(x
(j−1)
nj )
 ,
with
h : R −→ R, h(t) =
{
0 if t < 0
1 else
.
Then, the desired affine function is A(j)(t) = Σt. Since
Σ depends on the input of the layer, A(j) and A(j) are not
shared by all the input points.
Third, average pooling computes the mean over certain sub-
sets of the input vector. For example, the average of the first
four entries of y is obtained, introducing
a =
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
, 0, . . . , 0
)
∈ RNj ,
as 〈a, y〉. Then, since we have nj pools of p elements, it is
sufficient to create nj vectors similar to a, with entries equal
to 1/p in the positions of the elements we want to average and
zero else. We use then these vectors as rows of the matrix
A(j), getting A(j)(t) = A(j)t . We notice that A(j) does not
depend on the input y (as avg-pooling is already an affine
function).
Finally, the construction of A(j) for max-pooling layers is
analogue (as these layers return the maximum instead of the
mean). The main difference is that in this case A(j) may
change as y does. In fact, going back to our example, if we
want to extract the maximum among the first four entries of
y and assume that it is realized by the second component, we
can set a = (0, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RNj . If the position of the
maximum changes also the vector a changes. Again, 〈a, y〉
returns the value we are interested in. If p1, . . . , pnj are the
positions of the maxima for each of the nj pools, we can then
build A(j) ∈ Rnj×Nj as
A(j)rs =
{
1 if s = pr
0 else
, s = 1, . . . , Nj , r = 1, . . . , nj ,
so that A(j)(t) = A(j)t. Please notice that, similarly to the
case of ReLU layers, avg- and max-pooling layers usually
involve only the output of the immediately preceding layer.
Once we have computed the affine functions A(j) for ev-
ery j = 1, . . . , L + 1 we can explicitly derive recursively
the affine functions V(j) : Rd −→ Rnj , represented by the
matrices V (j) ∈ Rnj×d and vectors v(j) ∈ Rnj , satisfying
the conditions
f (j)(x, x(1), . . . , x(j−1)) ≡ V(j)(x) = V (j)x+ v(j). (5)
Let us start with j = 1, that is the first layer. Then V (1) and
the v(1) are the linear function and the bias which define
A(1), namely A(1) and a(1).
Assuming now that V(l) are available for l = 1, . . . , j−1, we
get V(j) combining Equations (2) and (5) and the definition
of A(j), so that
V(j)(x) = A(j)(x,V(1)(x), . . . ,V(j−1)(x)), (6)
which is affine as a composition of linear and affine functions
is affine again.
It still remains to compute the polytope Q(x) containing
x on which all the previous affine approximations hold ex-
actly. First, note that A(j) is independent of its input y (and
thus from the input x of the network as well) if j is either
a dense, convolutional, residual, avg-pooling or batch nor-
malization layer, meaning that A(j) is equivalent to f (j) on
the whole input space. Thus these layers do not contribute to
the definition of Q(x). We are left to define where the linear
reformulations of ReLU and max-pooling layers hold. As we
noticed above, these kinds of layers only take into account the
output of the immediately previous layer. Therefore, while
considering layer j, we are allowed to act like the only input
of f (j) was x(j−1).
Let f (j) be a ReLU layer and notice that the matrix Σ com-
puted for x(j−1) is the same for any vector whose compo-
nents have the same sign as those of x(j−1). Defining δ ele-
mentwise as
δr = sgn(x
(j−1)
r ), r = 1, . . . , nj−1,
with the convention sgn(0) = 11,we then get the set
S(j)(x(j−1)) = {z ∈ Rnj−1 | sgn(zr) = δr,
r = 1, . . . , nj−1}
containing the points of Rnj−1 which lead to the same matrix
Σ as x(j−1).We note that the condition sgn(zr) = δr is
equivalent to zrδr ≥ 0 and that we are interested in the
1 The case x(j−1)r = 0 implies that the region on which the affine
approximation holds has dimension smaller than that of the input space.
Setting sgn(0) = 1 we consider a polytope which contains as a face
the hyperplane defined by the condition x(j−1)r = 0.
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intersection of S(j) and the domain of layer j. With (5), we
define the polytope on which f (j) is affine,
Q(j)(x) = {z ∈ Rd ∣∣ δrV(j−1)(z) ≥ 0, r = 1, . . . , nj−1}
= {z ∈ Rd ∣∣ δr(V (j−1)z + v(j−1)) ≥ 0,
r = 1, . . . , nj−1}.
(7)
The set Q(j)(x) defines the region of the input space contain-
ing x and where A(j)(x) and thus f (j) is an affine function.
If f (j) is instead a max-pooling layer, we can see that A(j)
is preserved as long as the maximum within each pool is
realized at the same position. We can denote the nj pools as
the sets P 1, . . . , Pnj , whose elements are the indices of the
components of the input (of the max-pooling layer) involved
in the pool. Moreover we define for every r = 1, . . . , nj
prmax = argmax
i∈P r
x
(j−1)
i ,
that is the index of the component of x(j−1) attaining the
maximum for each pool P r. Then, for r = 1, . . . , nj ,
S(j)r (x
(j−1)) = {z ∈ Rnj−1 | zprmax ≥ zi, ∀i ∈ P r}
is the set of the vectors in Rnj−1 preserving the position of
the maximum computed at x(j−1) for pool P r. Similar to
what has been done for ReLU layers, we define
Q(j)r (x) ={z ∈ Rd | V(j−1)prmax (z) ≥ V
(j−1)
i (z), ∀i ∈ P r}
=
{
z ∈ Rd |
(
V
(j−1)
prmax
− V (j−1)i
)
z
+v
(j−1)
prmax
− v(j−1)i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ P r
}
,
(8)
so that, finally, Q(j)(x) =
⋂nj
r=1Q
(j)
r (x) is the subset of the
input space containing x on which f (j) is an affine function.
Note that Q(j)(x) = Rd if j is neither a ReLU nor a max-
pooling layer. The polytope Q(x) on which f (L+1) (and all
layers below) is affine is given by
Q(x) =
L+1⋂
j=1
Q(j)(x).
In the following we refer to Q(x) as the linear region of
x. Note also that the intersection of Q(x) with any other
polytope is still a polytope (e.g. this is necessary when the
input domain of a classifier is a subset of Rd). Note that
the explicit storage of the matrices V (j) is not possible for
large networks and high input dimension as one needsO(Nd)
memory. In Section 4 it will turn out that our attack algorithm
only requires matrix-vector products V (j)x which can be
done without computing V (j) explicitly and thus we can do
the whole attack on the GPU as long as the network itself fits
into GPU memory.
3 Minimal adversarial perturbation inside a linear
region
Classifiers based on neural networks have been shown to be
vulnerable to adversarial samples, that is they misclassify
inputs which are almost indistinguishable from an original,
correctly recognized test image [33,11]. The minimal adver-
sarial perturbation δ wrt an lp-norm is defined as the solution
of the following optimization problem
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p s.th. max
l 6=c
fl(x+ δ) ≥ fc(x+ δ),
x+ δ ∈ C,
(9)
with C being a set of constraints the input of f has to satisfy
(in the following we assume thatC is a polytope), e.g. images
scaled to be in [0, 1]d, x ∈ Rd is the original point and c the
class assigned to x by f (we assume x is correctly classified
by f ). The lp-norm of δ measures the difference between
original and adversarial inputs (changing p leads to adversar-
ial samples with different properties). In practice, one often
uses p = 2 or p =∞. We concentrate for simplicity in this
paper on p = 2, even though the framework allows to han-
dle any p-norm given that a fast solver is available for the
following linearized problem (11). Note that (9) represents
an untargeted attack, that is we just want that the decision
changes but we do not want to achieve that x+ δ is classified
as a particular class.
The optimization problem (9) is in general non-convex and
NP-hard [16]. However, as shown in [9], one can solve it
efficiently inside every linear region of the classifier, that is
if we add to (9) the constraint x+ δ ∈ Q(y), where Q(y) is
the linear region which contains the point y ∈ Rd. In fact,
recalling Section 2, we introduce for l 6= c the vectors δl as
the solutions of the K − 1 convex problems (note that we
assume that C is a polytope)
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p s.th.
〈
V
(L+1)
l − V (L+1)c , x+ δ
〉
+ v
(L+1)
l − v(L+1)c ≥ 0,
x+ δ ∈ C ∩Q(y).
(10)
Then, the solution of Problem (9) restricted to the linear
regionQ(y) is argmin
{δl:l 6=c}
‖δl‖p. While we are mainly interested
in untargeted attacks, we would like to highlight that targeted
attacks against any of the classes s 6= c are easily possible by
solving instead the following problem:
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p s.th.
〈
V (L+1)s − V (L+1)r , x+ δ
〉
+ v(L+1)s − v(L+1)r ≥ 0, ∀r 6= s,
x+ δ ∈ C ∩Q(y).
(11)
Please note that if one would solve (10) for all possible linear
regions and take the smallest perturbation, then this the exact
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solution of (9). However, due to the extremely large number
of linear regions this is infeasible in practice. Thus we use a
randomized scheme for selecting the next linear region which
is described in Section 4 together with a description of the
particular solver for the resulting quadratic program in (10)
for the choice of p = 2.
4 Generation of adversarial samples through
randomized local search
In the following we present an improved selection scheme of
the linear regions compared to the one in [9]. The observation
motivating our scheme is that the decision surface dividing
areas of the input space assigned to different classes extends
continuously across neighboring linear regions. If a point,
say y, lying on the decision boundary is available, it is highly
likely to find in its vicinity other points, again on the decision
boundary between two classes, closer than y to the target
image x. However, as pointed out in [9] it is very difficult
to determine neighboring regions as a large number of the
constraints defining the polytope are active at the solution of
(10). In this case the neighboring region is not unique and
checking all of them is infeasible and inefficient.
Thus we sample random points (more details below) in a
small ball centered around the currently best point y, that is
realizing the smallest adversarial perturbation found so far,
and then solve (10) in the corresponding linear region until
we find a better adversarial sample.
Moreover, we save the activation patterns of the linear re-
gions we have explored. Before checking a point and its
corresponding linear region we compare the activation pat-
tern to the ones of the points which we have already visited.
If the activation patterns agree it means that the two points
belong to the same region and then we can skip checking it
again.
Algorithm 1 shows our overall attack for a general lp-norm
trying to solve the optimization problem (9) for the minimal
adversarial perturbation. In the experiments we use either
N = 400 or N = 500, that is we check 400 resp. 500 linear
regions. Please note that Algorithm 1 requires to be fed with
a feasible point δWS of (9). There are several possibilities
e.g. an adversarial sample of a fast attack like DeepFool
as has been used in [9]. In this paper we prefer to be inde-
pendent of another attack. Thus we are using the following
scheme to chooseM starting points. At x we rank the classes
{1, . . . ,K} according to the components of corresponding
classifier output f(x) in descending order ρ, where ρ1 is
the class which is assigned to x. We choose the M classes
ρ2, . . . , ρM+1 in the ranking and compute the point zj in
the training set correctly classified by f in class ρj which is
closest to x for j = 2, . . . ,M + 1. In order to be speed up
the attack we do for each zj a binary search on [x, zj ] and
Algorithm 1: Our attack
Input :x original image, δWS starting perturbation, γ,N, p
Output :δ adversarial perturbation
1 δ ← δWS , u← ‖δ‖p
2 for j = 1, . . . , N do
3 y ← sampled according to (14)
4 if region containing y has not been checked already then
5 computation of Q(y)
6 δtemp ← solution of Problem (10) on Q(y)
7 if ‖δtemp‖p < u then δ ← δtemp, u← ‖δ‖p;
8 end
9 end
identify the point uj which is closest to x but is classified
differently from x and use δ(j)WS = uj−x, j = 2, . . . ,M+1,
as starting perturbations for Algorithm 1.
At each of the N iterations we sample a point around
the current best (smallest lp-norm) feasible point y := x+ δ
of (9). The following sampling scheme is biased towards x,
where q ∈ [ 12 , 1] is a parameter controlling the bias towards
x (q = 12 no bias, q = 1 maximal bias) and γ > 0 is a pa-
rameter controlling how localized our search is (the larger γ,
the more localized). We provide an analysis of the influence
of these parameters in Section 5.5. We sample i) uniformly a
point y⊥ from the intersection of the unit sphere Sd centered
in y and the hyperplane containing y with normal vector δ,
and ii) an angle θ ∈ [−pi, pi] given by
X1 r.v. : P(X1 = 1) = q, P(X1 = −1) = 1− q,
X2 ∼ U [0, pi],
θ = X1X2,
(12)
where U [0, pi] is the uniform distribution on the interval [0, pi].
We define δ⊥ = y⊥ − y. Note that by construction ∥∥δ⊥∥∥
2
=
1. Finally,
δnew = cos(θ)δ
⊥ − sin(θ) δ‖δ‖2
,
rnew = ‖δ‖2Xγ3 with X3 ∼ U [0, 1]
(13)
give direction and step size to produce the next point ynew
whose linear region will be checked, defined as
ynew = y + rnewδnew. (14)
Note that the larger γ the more biased ynew will be towards y.
On the other hand our sampling scheme makes a difference
between the half-sphere centered at y with pole at x = y − δ
versus the half-sphere with pole at y + δ. If q = 12 samples
from both half-sphere are equally probable, whereas if q = 1
one samples just from the half-sphere pointing towards x. At
first sight it might look strange that we do not choose q = 1,
as points sampled from the half-sphere pointing away from x
have larger distance from x than y. However, experiments on
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a small subset of points show that a value of q = 0.8 leads to
best results even though the difference to q = 1 is not large
and thus we fix it to q = 0.8 for all experiments. Moreover,
we use γ = 6 or γ = 9 for all experiments, noting anyway
that the attack is not very sensitive to this value as γ in the
range between 3 and 9 lead to very similar results. In Section
5.5 we provide a detailed analysis of the influence of these
two parameters on the performance of our scheme.
If C is a polytope e.g. C = [0, 1]d, then the optimization
problems (10) and (11) are equivalent to linear programs
(LP) for p = ∞ and p = 1 and equivalent to a quadratic
program (QP) for p = 2. The main cost of the attack is to
solve the optimization problem. Next we describe an efficient
scalable way of solving (10) for p = 2, avoiding the explicit
calculation of the linear regions.
4.1 A scalable and efficient solver for the quadratic program
Let us suppose x+ δ is our current best found solution, then
we would like that the solution of (10) produces a new δ′
which satisfies ‖δ′‖2 < ‖δ‖2. This implies that as soon as
we have a certificate that the optimal value of (10) is larger
than ‖δ‖2 then we can stop the solver as checking this region
will not yield an improvement. Thus we work with the dual
of (10) as the dual objective is always a lower bound on the
primal objective. As soon as we have found dual parameters
realizing a larger dual objective than ‖δ‖2 we can stop.
In the following we describe first how we solve the generic
resulting dual QP using accelerated gradient descent together
with coordinate descent in a subset of the variables. Then
we describe how this algorithm for solving the QP can be
efficiently implemented on the GPU without having to ever
to compute the constraint matrix. Note that in [9] we used the
commercial package Gurobi for solving the QP on the CPU.
Now we present an own implementation fully running on the
GPU which is roughly three orders of magnitude faster than
then our old implementation on the CPU and which allows
us to deal with fully-connected, convolutional and residual
layers.
Solving the dual problem. As we are mainly interested in
applications in computer vision we specialize to the case
C = [0, 1]d in (10), which can then be formulated as
min
z∈Rd
‖z − x‖22 s.th. Az ≤ b, z ∈ [0, 1]d. (15)
Note that the formulation is different from (10) but can be
transformed into each other using δ = z − x. The chosen
formulation of the optimization problem in (15) is better
adapted to the componentwise constraints imposed by C.
The primal problem is strongly convex and thus has a unique
solution. We derive the dual problem as
max
α,β∈Rd,µ∈Rm
q(µ, α, β) s.th. α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0,
(16)
where
q(µ, α, β) =− 1
2
∥∥ATµ+ α− β∥∥2
2
+
〈
ATµ+ α− β, y〉
− 〈α,1〉 − 〈µ, b〉
and the inequalities in (16) are componentwise. The corre-
spondence between the primal variable z and the dual optimal
variables α, β, µ is given by
z = y −ATµ− α+ β. (17)
Note however that even for dual feasible α, β and µ, the
primal variable z need not to be feasible. The KKT conditions
are
αi(xi − 1) = 0, βixi = 0, µi((Ax)i − bi) = 0.
This implies αiβi = 0. Solving for α, β yields
α = max{0, y −ATµ− 1}, β = max{0, ATµ− y}. (18)
Thus for fixed µ we can directly find the optimal values of α
and β. The dual problem is also a quadratic program but it is
not necessarily strongly convex as AAT does not need to be
positive definite. However, the gradient
∇µq = −AATµ+A(y − α+ β)− b
∇αq = ATµ+ α− β + y − 1
∇βq = −(ATµ+ α− β)− y
is Lipschitz continuous and the Lipschitz constant L can be
upper bounded as,
L ≤ max{∥∥ATA∥∥2 ,∥∥ATA∥∥ , 1}. (19)
We estimate
∥∥ATA∥∥2 via the power method with 20 itera-
tions, which is enough to get already a quite accurate estimate.
We solve the QP itself with accelerated projected gradient
descent [26,3,7] in µ by setting α and β to their optimal val-
ues for given µ as in (18) which can be seen as a mixture of a
coordinate descent in α, β and accelerated projected gradient
descent in µ. Note that in all steps we never need the matrix
A explicitly, but just matrix vector products ATµ or Az if
we want to compute feasibility of the current primal variable
z. Even for the computation of
∥∥ATA∥∥ we use the power
method which also only requires matrix vector products. The
only caveat is a good pre-conditioning of the problem, which
can be achieved by normalizing the rows ai, i = 1, . . . , N of
A to have unit norm (with corresponding rescaling of b). One
can compute them via matrix vector products ai = AT ei, but
this would require too many of them. We discuss how this
can be resolved in the next section and how the whole QP
solver can be ported to the GPU.
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4.2 Solving the QP efficiently on the GPU without explicit
computation of the constraint matrix A
As discussed at the end of the previous section, the QP solver
via accelerated gradient descent does not require the explicit
computation of A as long as there is a way to compute matrix
vector products ATµ and Az efficiently. While in [9] the
matrix A has been explicitly computed on the CPU, this is
no longer feasible for larger networks as the memory con-
sumption is O(Nd), where d is the input dimension and N
the total number of neurons. Even if one uses sparse matrix
formats e.g. in the case of convolutional layers, this does
not help to reduce the required memory significantly if the
network is deep. Moreover, also the computation of the hyper-
planes requires a computational cost equivalent to d forward
passes of the network.
Thus a major improvement of this paper compared to [9] is
the transfer of all computations from the CPU to the GPU
which is only possible if the matrix A is not explicitly com-
puted as the GPU memory would not suffice for this. The
major insight to do this is that accelerated gradient descent
only requires matrix-vector products of the form ATµ and
Az. Note that A contains basically the concatenated matrices
V (j) from (7) and (8). However, we note that according to
(5) it holds
f (j)(x, x(1), . . . , x(j−1)) = V(j)(x) = V (j)x+ v(j),
and thus V (j) is nothing else than the Jacobian Jf (j) of f (j)
with respect to x and
v(j) = f (j)(x, x(1), . . . , x(j−1))− V (j)x.
Suppose for simplicity that
f (j)(x) = gj(gj−1(. . . (g1(x)) . . .)).
Then the Jacobian Jf (j) of f (j) at x is given by the chain
rule as
V (j) = Jf (j)
∣∣
x
= Jgj
∣∣
gj−1(x)
Jgj−1
∣∣
gj−2(x)
· · · Jg1
∣∣
x
.
Note that V (j)u can be evaluated as
V (j)u = Jf (j)
∣∣
x
u
= Jgj
∣∣
gj−1(x)
(
Jg−1
∣∣
gj−2(x)
(
· · ·
(
Jg1
∣∣
x
u
)
· · ·
))
.
In the same way we can compute wTV (j) as
wTV (j) = wTJf (j)
∣∣
x
=
(
· · ·
(
wTJgj
∣∣
gj−1(x)
)
Jgj−1
∣∣
gj−2(x)
· · ·
)
Jg1
∣∣
x
.
Thus calculating V (j)u requires a single forward pass through
the network and wTV (j) requires a forward pass for com-
puting the values gj(x) and then a backward pass through
the network. More general, the computation of the Jacobian-
vector products can be done via automatic differentiation
(forward-mode resp. backward-mode automatic differentia-
tion). Finally, to calculate the above expressions efficiently
we still need a fast way to compute Jgk
∣∣
y
v and zTJgk
∣∣
y
for
primitive functions gk e.g. if gk is a convolution, then Jgk
∣∣
y
v
can be computed as well as a convolution and zTJgk
∣∣
y
as
the transposed convolution. Fortunately, modern implemen-
tations of automatic differentiation already come with a large
collection of primitive functions and corresponding rules for
Jgk(y)v and zTJgk(y). Thus, we can directly and efficiently
compute them on the GPU without computing the Jacobians
itself. Thus our QP solver does not require much more mem-
ory than the network itself which allows it to scale to large
networks.
Note that for pre-conditioning of A it would make sense
to rescale the rows of A to have unit norm (one has to rescale
correspondingly also the vector b). While every row vector
ai of A can be obtained as ai = eTi A and thus also just
via matrix-vector products, doing this for every row is pro-
hibitively expensive. Thus we use the fact that the norms of
the row vectors corresponding to the same hidden layer have
quite similar norms (typically we see increasing norms as
one moves from lower to upper layers). Thus we just sample
a small number of rows (in our case 10) of each layer, com-
pute their norms, take the mean of them and use the inverse
of that as a rescaling factor for that layer. While this coarse
pre-conditioning scheme is worse than if one rescales every
row individually, it is significantly better than not doing any
rescaling at all. There is one exception: we upscale the con-
straint of the decision boundary, as we have found that this
leads to faster feasibility of this constraint which is the most
important one of all the constraints.
Moreover, we do not need an accurate solution of (10) and
thus we have found that in practice 500 iterations of the ac-
celerated gradient descent scheme suffice to get a reasonable
solution. As the primal variable z in (17) obtained from the
dual variables need not be feasible, we explicitly check if the
output z is an adversarial sample. If not then we check via a
small line search x+ α(z − x), where α ≥ 1, if it is an ad-
versarial sample as long as α ‖z − x‖2 < ‖δ‖, where ‖δ‖ is
the norm of the perturbation of the currently best adversarial
sample x+ δ. Finally, this leads to a scheme which is more
than three orders of magnitude faster than that in [9].
5 Experiments
In this section we show that our attack often outperforms the
state-of-the-art methods to compute upper bounds on the ro-
bust accuracy of a model, which is defined for a given  > 0,
as the minimal accuracy that the classifier can achieve if each
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average difference to the best l2 robust accuracy
model PGD-1 PGD-10k CW-10k CW-100k DF ours
MNIST 0.2367 0.1011 0.1701 0.1681 0.3135 0.0051
GTS 0.0361 0.0237 0.0177 0.0172 0.0643 0
CIFAR-10 0.0693 0.0515 0.0045 0.0037 0.0812 0.0060
maximum difference to the best l2 robust accuracy
model PGD-1 PGD-10k CW-10k CW-100k DF ours
MNIST 0.7800 0.5040 0.6200 0.6120 0.9000 0.0500
GTS 0.1600 0.1260 0.0440 0.0420 0.1140 0
CIFAR-10 0.2280 0.2040 0.0180 0.0180 0.1220 0.0140
Table 1: Performances of different attacks. For each dataset, attack and threshold , we compute the differences between the
robust accuracies estimated by an attack and the best one among those of all the attacks. We here report, given dataset and
attack, the mean (top) and the maximum (bottom) of these differences across the thresholds. We can see that our attack has the
smallest average distance from the best on two of three datasets and always achieves the best maximal distance. Notably, on
GTS both mean and maximum for our attack are 0, which means that it gets the lowest robust accuracy for every model and .
test sample is allowed to be perturbed within a p-norm ball of
radius  in order to achieve a misclassification. The smaller
the found robust accuracy the stronger is the attack and the
less robust is the network. We focus here on the l2-attack.
The code for our attack is publicly available2.
We show that current state-of-the-art attacks sometimes over-
estimate the robustness of classifiers. In fact, with our attack
we are often able to achieve smaller robust accuracy than our
competitors, and even when we do not we never overestimate
the robust test accuracy more than 5.0% compared to the
minimal one found by the competitors. In contrast, all the
other attacks have cases where they achieve a robust accu-
racy at least 50.4% larger than that provided by our method
(see Table 1). Thus if one just evaluates robustness using
the competing attacks, one would consider models robust
which are in fact quite non-robust. Our technique does not
show a similar weakness in any setting, pointing out how our
algorithm is, on one side, able to recover in general small ad-
versarial perturbations and, on the other side, less susceptible
to changes in the characteristics of the network. Interestingly,
we notice that l2- gradient-based methods suffer especially
when attacking models trained with l∞-adversarial training.
We consider three datasets: MNIST, German Traffic Sign
(GTS) [32] and CIFAR-10 [17] (all images are scaled in
[0, 1]d). On each of them three models are trained, the plain
model (plain), one with l2-adversarial training (called l2-
at) and one with l∞-adversarial training (l∞-at) (we use
the adversarial training scheme of [21] that is based on the
Projected Gradient Descent attack). More details about archi-
tectures and training are provided below.
We compare our attack against: Projected Gradient Descent
on the loss function (PGD) [21], Carlini-Wagner l2-attack
(CW) [6] and DeepFool (DF) [23]. We use two versions of
2 https://github.com/jonasrauber/
linear-region-attack
PGD: PGD-1 uses a single starting point, while PGD-10k
exploits 10000 restarts, randomly sampled in the l2-ball of
radius  around the original image. This large number of
restarts is motivated by a recent paper which could break a
certain defense only when using 10000 restarts of PGD [24].
For both PGD versions we set k = 40 iterations and, if  is
the threshold at which we want to evaluate robust accuracy,
we use a step size of /4. Similarly, we evaluate CW in the
implementation of [27] with 40 binary search steps and either
10000 (CW-10k) or 100000 iterations (CW-100k). We use
the DF implementation as in [30].
Since the objective of PGD is only to find out if there
exists an adversarial sample with norm less than the threshold
, it provides directly the robust accuracy at  (and must be
rerun for each threshold ). On the contrary, CW, DeepFool
and our attack try to find the minimal adversarial perturba-
tion as in (9). After running these attacks, we compute the
robust accuracy for a given threshold as the fraction of points
whose adversarial examples are farther, in l2-distance, than
. Note that we only check correctly classified points for all
methods. The obtained values of robust accuracy achieved
for all attacks and different thresholds are reported in Tables
2 (MNIST), 3 (GTS) and 4 (CIFAR-10).
In order to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of an
attack, it is necessary to assess average and worst case per-
formance. In this way one can see whether it overfits to
some particular model, dataset or training scheme. For ev-
ery dataset we compute for all thresholds  the difference
between the robust accuracy provided by every attack and
the minimal robust accuracy across all the attacks for the
fixed threshold. Thus the worse the performance a method
achieves, the larger the difference is. In Table 1 we report for
each attack the mean and the maximal distance from the best
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l2 robust accuracy on MNIST
model  PGD-
1
PGD-
10k
CW-
10k
CW-
100k
DF ours
plain
0.0 0.984
0.5 0.928 0.926 0.926 0.926 0.936 0.926
1.0 0.508 0.472 0.474 0.474 0.586 0.474
1.5 0.168 0.106 0.088 0.088 0.198 0.078
2.0 0.106 0.028 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.002
2.5 0.078 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
l2-at
0.0 0.986
1.0 0.930 0.930 0.926 0.926 0.938 0.926
1.5 0.838 0.834 0.846 0.848 0.872 0.834
2.0 0.698 0.672 0.706 0.706 0.790 0.680
2.5 0.468 0.366 0.466 0.464 0.674 0.416
3.0 0.192 0.096 0.170 0.172 0.542 0.112
l∞-at
0.0 0.984
1.0 0.924 0.878 0.888 0.888 0.948 0.736
1.5 0.886 0.748 0.774 0.776 0.932 0.258
2.0 0.812 0.536 0.652 0.644 0.918 0.032
2.5 0.758 0.248 0.552 0.538 0.904 0.004
3.0 0.658 0.064 0.480 0.468 0.848 0.000
Table 2: Robustness of MNIST models. We report upper
bounds on the robust accuracy, that is the fraction of points
in the test set which are still correctly classified when any
perturbation of l2-norm smaller than or equal to  is allowed
in order to achieve a misclassification (a smaller robust accu-
racy means a stronger attack). The statistics are computed on
the first 500 points of the MNIST test set.
accuracy, across the three models and five thresholds , for
each of the three datasets. It can be directly seen from this
table that our attack has at the same time the best worst case
performance for all three datasets and the best average per-
formance in two of three datasets with only a tiny difference
in the case it is worse.
In particular, we can see how on MNIST the second best
attack (PGD-10k) is on average 10.11% worse than the mini-
mal robust accuracy, compared to 0.51% for our attack, while
in the worst case it returns a robust accuracy 50.4% larger
than the minimal one versus 5.0% for our method. On GTS,
both average and maximal difference are 0.0% for our attack,
meaning that it always achieves the minimal robust accuracy
among all competing methods. Although on CIFAR-10 we
cannot match the average result of CW attack, our attack has
nevertheless the best worst case performance, highlighting
the quality of our approach.
5.1 Main experiments: details
MNIST. For MNIST we use the same architecture as in [21],
consisting in 2 convolutional layers of 16 and 32 filters, each
followed by max-pooling, and 2 dense layers. In particular,
the plain and l∞- trained models are the natural and se-
cret models of “MNIST Adversarial Examples Challenge”3,
based on [21]. For l2-at we adapted the code of [21] to per-
form adversarial training using the PGD attack wrt the l2-
norm with  = 2 and 40 iterations. The clean accuracy of the
models can be found in Table 2 in the row corresponding to
 = 0. Moreover, we use M = 5 different starting points for
our attack (corresponding to five classes) andN = 500 as the
maximum number of linear regions checked, or equivalently
iterations in Algorithm 1, for each starting point. Moreover
we set the parameter γ in Algorithm 1 to 6.
In Table 2 we report the robust accuracy, computed on 500
points of the test set, for the three models when the l2-norm
of the perturbations is bounded by . We see that in most of
the cases our attack achieves the best performance. In par-
ticular, on the l∞-trained model all the other gradient-based
methods suggest that the classifier is highly robust, while our
attack shows that this is not the case, as it turns out to be
just slightly less vulnerable to adversarial examples than the
plain model (e.g. at  = 2.0 the best of other attacks reduces
accuracy only to 53.6% while our technique brings it down
to 3.2%).
Notably, in [31] the same l∞-at model was tested and, tak-
ing the pointwise best output among those of 11 attacks of
various nature, the authors could decrease robust accuracy
no more than 35% with  = 1.5. On the other hand we see
that our attack alone, without even testing all the possible
9 target classes, yields an upper bound on robust accuracy
for the same  of 25.8%, which is almost 10% less than the
current state-of-the-art [4].
GTS. In this case the models are CNNs with 2 convolutional
layers (16 and 32 feature maps) with stride 2, which replaces
max-pooling for downsizing, and 2 dense layers. Adversarial
training is based on 40 iterations of PGD attack, with  = 0.5
for l2-at and  = 4/255 for l∞-at. Since GTS has 43 classes,
we run our algorithm withM = 15 starting points, 500 linear
regions each and γ = 9.
Table 3 shows how the upper bounds on robust accuracy,
computed on the first 500 images of the test set, obtained
through our technique are always smaller than those by the
competitors, apart from 4 cases out of 15 where the PGD
results can only match ours. We notice that, although in
some cases the difference is not extremely large, in 3 of 15
settings our attack reduces the robust accuracy at least by
2% compared to the best result of the other methods, with
a maximum of 4.2% for  = 1.25 for the l∞-trained model
(robust accuracy of 11.4% by CW-100k vs 7.2% for our
attack).
CIFAR-10. Since CIFAR-10 represents a more difficult clas-
sification task, we use for it a deeper and wider architecture,
3 https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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l2 robust accuracy on GTS
model  PGD-
1
PGD-
10k
CW-
10k
CW-
100k
DF ours
plain
0.0 0.946
0.1 0.746 0.746 0.754 0.754 0.788 0.740
0.2 0.568 0.562 0.566 0.566 0.628 0.550
0.4 0.360 0.348 0.334 0.334 0.408 0.316
0.6 0.298 0.274 0.214 0.214 0.292 0.178
0.8 0.268 0.234 0.124 0.124 0.210 0.108
l2-at
0.0 0.908
0.1 0.818 0.818 0.826 0.820 0.826 0.818
0.2 0.708 0.704 0.706 0.710 0.728 0.704
0.4 0.488 0.472 0.496 0.496 0.538 0.468
0.6 0.328 0.320 0.322 0.322 0.378 0.320
0.8 0.222 0.218 0.224 0.222 0.284 0.212
l∞-at
0.0 0.904
0.25 0.690 0.686 0.692 0.692 0.718 0.686
0.5 0.460 0.446 0.468 0.466 0.500 0.444
0.75 0.302 0.288 0.300 0.300 0.338 0.280
1.0 0.212 0.200 0.214 0.214 0.246 0.194
1.25 0.164 0.130 0.116 0.114 0.172 0.072
Table 3: Robustness of GTS models. We report upper bounds
on the robust accuracy, that is the fraction of points in the test
set which are still correctly classified when any perturbation
of l2-norm smaller than or equal to  is allowed in order to
achieve a misclassification (a smaller robust accuracy means
a stronger attack). The statistics are computed on the first
500 points of the GTS test set.
made of 8 convolutional layers (with number of filters in-
creasing from 96 to 384) and 2 dense layers, which contains
overall more than 375000 units. We perform adversarial train-
ing again with the PGD attack, with 10 iterations,  = 80/255
and  = 4/255 for l2- and l∞-robust training respectively. We
here run our attack with 400 iterations and 3 starting points,
fixing γ = 9.
The statistics over the first 500 points of the test set are sum-
marized in Table 4. Although with this dataset we see that
the best performances are achieved by different methods in
many situations, we can nevertheless notice that our attack
clearly outperforms PGD and DF and is at most 1.4% off
from the best robust accuracy. CW attack performs here very
well but it still has a slightly worse performance in the worst
case setting, as we can see in Table 1.
Moreover, these CIFAR-10 networks are less robust than
those trained on MNIST and GTS, so that the task of crafting
small adversarial examples is easier than previously. This
implies that even weak attackers can succeed in finding good,
maybe almost optimal, adversarial perturbations.
5.2 Testing provably robust models
In this section we test classifiers trained to be provably robust,
that is it is possible to compute for a large fraction of the
test points if there exists or not an adversarial perturbation
l2 robust accuracy on CIFAR-10
model  PGD-
1
PGD-
10k
CW-
10k
CW-
100k
DF ours
plain
0.0 0.892
0.1 0.686 0.676 0.694 0.694 0.722 0.690
0.15 0.546 0.536 0.554 0.552 0.626 0.550
0.2 0.440 0.422 0.434 0.432 0.512 0.434
0.3 0.256 0.234 0.216 0.216 0.338 0.220
0.4 0.182 0.146 0.094 0.092 0.208 0.098
l2-at
0.0 0.812
0.25 0.658 0.656 0.660 0.660 0.670 0.656
0.5 0.496 0.488 0.482 0.482 0.538 0.478
0.75 0.382 0.362 0.324 0.324 0.422 0.324
1.0 0.358 0.322 0.212 0.204 0.300 0.216
1.25 0.336 0.302 0.114 0.114 0.224 0.124
l∞-at
0.0 0.794
0.25 0.646 0.644 0.646 0.646 0.670 0.644
0.5 0.488 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.530 0.488
0.75 0.390 0.368 0.332 0.332 0.414 0.334
1.0 0.352 0.332 0.226 0.228 0.326 0.228
1.25 0.348 0.324 0.120 0.120 0.242 0.130
Table 4: Robustness of CIFAR-10 models. We report upper
bounds on the robust accuracy, that is the fraction of points
in the test set which are still correctly classified when any
perturbation of l2-norm smaller than or equal to  is allowed
in order to achieve a misclassification (a smaller robust accu-
racy means a stronger attack). The statistics are computed on
the first 500 points of the CIFAR-10 test set.
with norm smaller than a fixed threshold. This means that
non-trivial lower bounds on the robust accuracy are provided.
For what concerns upper bounds, we have mostly to rely,
especially for the l2 case, on the adversarial examples pro-
vided by the attacks. Then, using powerful attacks allows
also to correctly assess the tightness of the lower bounds or
equivalently the effectiveness of the verification methods.
We consider the models presented in [8], that is CNNs with
2 convolutional layers of 16 and 32 filters and a hidden fully-
connected layer of 100 units. These are trained with the
techniques of either [8] (called MMR) or [36,37] (KW) to
be robust wrt the l2-norm at train = 0.3 for MNIST and
train = 0.1 for CIFAR-10, wrt the l∞-norm at train = 0.1 for
MNIST and train = 2/255. We decide to test the l2 robustness
of all the models with thresholds  larger than those used
for l2 robust training since at those levels the uncertainty on
robust accuracy is limited as tight bounds on it are available
(see [8]). We run our attack for 500 regions and 5 starting
points. In Table 5 (MNIST) and Table 6 (CIFAR-10) we re-
port similarly to the previous section the upper bounds on
the robust accuracy, computed with 500 test points, provided
the different attacks (we here use PGD-1k with 1000 restarts
instead of the weaker version with a single restart).
For both datasets we see that our attack outperforms, often
significantly, the competitors, with the only exception being
the largest value of  on the model trained with KW tech-
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l2 robust accuracy on MNIST
model  PGD-
1k
PGD-
10k
CW-
10k
CW-
100k
DF ours
l∞-
MMR-at
0.0 0.988
1.0 0.828 0.816 0.854 0.854 0.868 0.704
1.5 0.488 0.428 0.642 0.642 0.682 0.250
2.0 0.310 0.270 0.414 0.412 0.642 0.048
2.5 0.222 0.180 0.196 0.194 0.238 0.004
3.0 0.136 0.116 0.074 0.070 0.084 0.000
l∞-KW
0.0 0.982
1.0 0.924 0.910 0.924 0.924 0.926 0.854
1.5 0.674 0.600 0.834 0.834 0.898 0.478
2.0 0.226 0.176 0.664 0.662 0.844 0.148
2.5 0.030 0.020 0.454 0.454 0.784 0.018
3.0 0.002 0.000 0.264 0.264 0.644 0.002
l2-
MMR-at
0.0 0.986
1.0 0.848 0.848 0.850 0.850 0.868 0.842
1.5 0.608 0.606 0.622 0.622 0.682 0.576
2.0 0.286 0.270 0.312 0.312 0.462 0.238
2.5 0.050 0.048 0.090 0.090 0.238 0.044
3.0 0.016 0.012 0.032 0.030 0.084 0.010
l2-KW
0.0 0.988
1.0 0.916 0.916 0.914 0.914 0.928 0.912
1.5 0.722 0.716 0.740 0.740 0.826 0.692
2.0 0.392 0.366 0.438 0.438 0.690 0.298
2.5 0.214 0.202 0.166 0.166 0.478 0.078
3.0 0.172 0.152 0.046 0.046 0.292 0.012
Table 5: Provably robust MNIST models. We report upper
bounds on the robust accuracy, that is the fraction of points
in the test set which are still correctly classified when any
perturbation of l2-norm smaller than or equal to  is allowed
in order to achieve a misclassification (a smaller robust accu-
racy means a stronger attack). The statistics are computed on
the first 500 points of the MNIST test set.
nique wrt l∞-norm on MNIST. Moreover, note that similar to
Table 2, the largest differences (over 22% between the upper
bounds on robust accuracies of PGD-100k and our attack) are
reached for the classifier trained on MNIST with adversarial
training from [21] wrt l∞.
5.3 Attacking large models
In order to show the scalability of our approach to large
models, we here attack the networks from “CIFAR-10 Ad-
versarial Examples Challenge”4 trained on CIFAR-10 with
either plain or l∞-adversarial training [21] (called naturally
trained and secret in the original challenge). The architecture
used is a residual convolutional network consisting of a con-
volutional layer, five residual blocks and a fully-connected
layer, derived from the “w32-10 wide” variant of the Ten-
sorFlow model repository, with 2.883.593 units. In order to
apply our algorithm we had to replace the per image normal-
ization, which is not an affine operation on the input, with the
4 https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_
challenge
l2 robust accuracy on CIFAR-10
model  PGD-
1k
PGD-
10k
CW-
10k
CW-
100k
DF ours
l∞-
MMR-at
0.0 0.638
0.25 0.504 0.504 0.490 0.490 0.498 0.484
0.5 0.332 0.330 0.340 0.340 0.348 0.314
0.75 0.180 0.174 0.176 0.174 0.210 0.154
1.0 0.066 0.064 0.070 0.070 0.096 0.056
1.25 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.050 0.028
l∞-KW
0.0 0.532
0.25 0.390 0.390 0.376 0.376 0.374 0.364
0.5 0.238 0.236 0.218 0.218 0.236 0.216
0.75 0.132 0.130 0.128 0.128 0.146 0.104
1.0 0.060 0.060 0.064 0.064 0.082 0.036
1.25 0.018 0.018 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.014
l2-
MMR-at
0.0 0.618
0.25 0.418 0.418 0.404 0.404 0.412 0.398
0.5 0.270 0.266 0.264 0.262 0.284 0.252
0.75 0.146 0.144 0.146 0.146 0.174 0.128
1.0 0.076 0.076 0.094 0.094 0.104 0.064
1.25 0.032 0.032 0.050 0.050 0.054 0.024
l2-KW
0.0 0.614
0.25 0.492 0.492 0.478 0.478 0.480 0.478
0.5 0.384 0.384 0.374 0.374 0.376 0.360
0.75 0.266 0.266 0.262 0.262 0.284 0.246
1.0 0.172 0.172 0.176 0.176 0.190 0.152
1.25 0.094 0.092 0.108 0.108 0.122 0.082
Table 6: Provably robust CIFAR-10 models. We report upper
bounds on the robust accuracy, that is the fraction of points
in the test set which are still correctly classified when any
perturbation of l2-norm smaller than or equal to  is allowed
in order to achieve a misclassification (a smaller robust accu-
racy means a stronger attack). The statistics are computed on
the first 500 points of the CIFAR-10 test set.
l2 robust accuracy of large networks on CIFAR-10
model  PGD-1k DF ours
plain
0.0 0.96
0.05 0.78 0.83 0.78
0.075 0.61 0.75 0.60
0.1 0.43 0.63 0.44
0.15 0.18 0.42 0.18
0.2 0.08 0.26 0.07
l∞-at
0.0 0.85
0.25 0.72 0.75 0.71
0.5 0.53 0.62 0.54
0.75 0.36 0.51 0.37
1.0 0.23 0.44 0.22
1.25 0.15 0.37 0.12
Table 7: Large models. We report here the robust accuracy,
that is an upper bound on the fraction of points in the test
set which are correctly classified when any perturbation of
l2-norm smaller than or equal to  is allowed (a smaller
robust accuracy means a stronger attack). The statistics are
computed on the first 100 points of the CIFAR-10 test set.
following step: for each input image, we subtract the mean
of its entries and divide it by a constant (0.21, which is an
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Fig. 1: Progression of our attack for different sampling schemes on MNIST. We show median (left), maximum (center) and
mean (right) of the norms of the adversarial perturbations found by our attack as a function of the explored linear regions.
We repeat the experiments for different values of q (see Equation (12)), represented in different colors, and with the uniform
sampling scheme (q = 0.5) from [9] as a comparison.
Fig. 2: Progression of our attack for different values of the parameter γ on MNIST. We show median (left), maximum (center)
and mean (right) of the norms of the adversarial perturbations found by our attack as a function of the explored linear regions.
We repeat the experiments for γ = 1, . . . , 9 (see Equation (13)) represented in different colors.
approximation of the average standard deviation across the
images of the training set). Note that this small variation does
not affect the performance of the classifier while allows the
network to result in a piecewise affine function.
In Table 7 we report the robust accuracy, on the first 100
test points, given by the three methods (in this case we use
PGD with 1000 but not 10000 restarts as it would be compu-
tationally too expensive). We omit CW since with the default
parameters it fails to provide meaningful results. For our
method we use 5 starting points. While DeepFool is always
worse than the others, PGD and our attack perform similarly,
although the largest gap (3%, achieved at  = 1.25 for the
l∞-at model) is in favour of our method.
5.4 Runtime comparison
We analyze the runtime the different attacks take to return
results on 500 test points on the plain model on CIFAR-10 of
Section 5.1 using a single GPU. Note that CW, DeepFool and
our method aim at finding the minimal adversarial perturba-
tion within a limited budget of iterations while PGD takes as
input a thresholds  and looks for a manipulation with norm
smaller than it, but does not try to minimize it. This means
that, in order to build Table 4 one has to run PGD once for
each value . Conversely, for the other attacks a single run is
sufficient to compute the robust accuracy at every threshold.
We compare the runtime of the attacks in the setting used for
the experiment in Table 4, and report the total time needed
to run the attacks on 500 different points on a single GPU:
PGD-10k takes around 18 hours for a single threshold. CW-
100k needs 55 hours in total and our method takes 150 hours
(using 3 starting points), while the fastest but also weakest
attack is DeepFool with a runtime of less than one minute.
5.5 Choosing parameters
In order to choose a proper parameter q for the sampling
scheme in Equation (12) we run our attack on the MNIST
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Fig. 3: Progression of our attack for different sampling schemes on GTS. We show median (left), maximum (center) and mean
(right) of the norms of the adversarial perturbations found by our attack as a function of the explored linear regions. We repeat
the experiments for different values of q (see Equation (12)), represented in different colors, and with the uniform sampling
scheme (q = 0.5) from [9] as a comparison.
Fig. 4: Progression of our attack for different values of the parameter γ on GTS. We show median (left), maximum (center)
and mean (right) of the norms of the adversarial perturbations found by our attack as a function of the explored linear regions.
We repeat the experiments for γ = 1, . . . , 9 (see Equation (13)) represented in different colors.
plain model, already introduced in Section 5.1, with q ∈
{0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0} and with the scheme proposed in [9],
where the next linear region to check is chosen by sampling
uniformly a direction from the current best solution (corre-
sponding to q = 0.5). In Figure 1 we show the development
of median (left), maximum (center) and mean (right) of the
l2-norms of the adversarial perturbations found as a function
of the explored linear regions. We can see that the final val-
ues of the statistics do not differ significantly. Moreover, we
repeat the previous experiment, this time varying the value
of γ in Equation (13). In particular, we test γ = 1, . . . , 9 and
report in Figure 2 median (left), maximum (center) and mean
(right) of the l2-norms of the adversarial perturbations found
as a function of the explored linear regions. We can see that,
while for γ = 1 the results are much worse and for γ = 2 the
convergence to the final solution is significantly slower, the
algorithm appears to perform similarly with γ between 3 and
9.
We also run the experiments on the GTS plain model. In
Figure 3 one can see that higher values of q lead to faster
convergence to the final solutions (we fix γ = 9). In Fig-
ure 4 we test different values of γ between 1 and 9 keeping
constant q = 0.8. We notice that all the runs achieve simi-
lar performance, even for small values of γ differently from
what happens on MNIST. This observation, together with the
fact that about 15 regions are sufficient for the results to be
almost indistinguishable from the final ones, suggests that
this model is easier to attack than the one on MNIST.
Thus we choose to set q = 0.8 as for smaller values the runs
converge slightly more slowly, while for q = 1.0 the maxi-
mum appears to be marginally suboptimal (anyway we want
to highlight that the results are in the end almost identical).
Finally, from these ablation studies one can also appreciate
the stability of the method with respect to the random part
inherent to the algorithm. In fact, with the exception of the
case γ = 1 on MNIST, in all the runs obtained varying the
parameters q and γ, median, maximum and mean converge
to the same or very similar values, meaning that sampling
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different points and then possibly checking different regions
does not lead to inconsistent results.
6 Visualizing the decision boundary
While our attack runs, almost at each iteration an image ly-
ing on the decision boundary, that is the classifier outputs
assigns the same (up to a tolerance) probability for the input
to belong to different classes, is available. In fact, unless the
linear region to which the current solution belongs does not
intersect the decision boundary, the solution of problem (10)
is attained when the first constraint holds as an equality.
In Figure 5 we show some of these intermediate solutions
found while crafting an adversarial example. The first three
rows are obtained attacking the plain models reported in the
Section 5, while for the fourth to sixth row we used respec-
tively the l∞-at network on MNIST and the l2-at classifiers
on GTS and CIFAR-10. For every row, the first image is the
starting point of our method and belongs to the training set of
the respective dataset, while the second image is the point we
get through the initial binary search on the segment joining
the starting point and the target image for which we want to
provide an adversarial perturbation (represented in the last
image of each row). We also report the l2-distance between
each image and the target image, which is equivalent to the
l2-norm of the adversarial manipulation found at that itera-
tion of the algorithm.
We can see that, apart from the starting image and the target
image, all the images lie on the decision boundary. Further-
more, in many cases, although the distance from the target im-
age is notable, they are clearly assignable to a specific class,
meaning that the decision boundary is still wrong showing
that there is still quite some way to go if we want to achieve
robustness with respect to human perception of these images.
We can also check how large the linear regions are. The
first polytope Q(y) our attack checks is the one containing
the point y of the linear search performed as initial step of
the attack between the image from the training set and the
target image. We show the image y and the solution of (10)
on Q(y). Both images are contained in Q(y) and both lie
on the decision boundary. In Figure 6 we show these two
images for some cases for the GTS models. It is interesting
that, although the number of polytopes is extremely large,
they are still wide enough to contain images of such different
appearance and with significant l2-distance.
7 Conclusion
We extended the white-box gradient-free adversarial attack of
[9] by i) deriving a new, scalable QP solver, ii) solving the QP
problem efficiently on GPU without computing the constraint
matrix explicitly, iii) adding support for more layer types, and
iv) introducing a new attack scheme to select regions. Taken
together, these improvements allowed us to attack larger and
more complex neural networks in less time and finding better
adversarial examples. We demonstrated the importance of
evaluating robustness with our attack by showing that all
the established methods for producing adversarial examples
have at least one case where they estimate a robust accuracy
at least 50% higher (in absolute value) than that given by
the best attack, while our attack is never farther than 5%.
This means that, while most of the attacks perform well on
average, for all of them except ours there exist situations
where they heavily overestimate the adversarial robustness.
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